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Articles
Untangling Right from Wrong in Insanity Law: Of
Dogs, Wolves & God
KATE E. BLOCH†
In almost all U.S. jurisdictions, a qualifying mental illness that prevents an accused from
distinguishing right from wrong can provide support for a determination of legal insanity.
Nonetheless, “wrongfulness” remains a term of myriad and somewhat elusive meanings. Instead
of enhancing clarity, by engaging with simplified examples, the U.S. Supreme Court’s broadbrush approach in its 2020 majority and dissenting opinions in Kahler v. Kansas threatens to
exacerbate confusion about “wrongfulness” in legal insanity doctrine. This Article surfaces
challenges in the Court’s and dissent’s analyses and aims to discourage reliance on problematic
assumptions about “wrongfulness” in insanity law.

† Professor of Law and Harry & Lillian Hastings Research Chair, University of California, Hastings
College of the Law. I am grateful to colleagues who provided invaluable insights on earlier versions of this
Article, especially Evan Lee, Jessica Vapnek, and Lois Weithorn. I am also indebted to forensic psychiatrist Dr.
Jeffrey Gould (co-author on a previous article) for his wisdom and guidance on an earlier draft of this Article. I
benefitted from his decades of experience evaluating individuals advancing insanity claims in criminal cases. I
am also grateful for the fine work of my library liaison, Vince Moyer, and my research assistant, Richard Yates.
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INTRODUCTION
If, “as a result of severe mental illness, the defendant thought that a dog
ordered him to kill”1 a human being, and the defendant killed someone in
response to that command, should that qualify as legal insanity? Justice Breyer
opened Part I of his March 2020 dissent in the U.S. Supreme Court decision in
Kahler v. Kansas2 with this “much-simplified example.”3 He then asserted that
“[u]nder the insanity defense as traditionally understood, the government cannot
convict [the] defendant”4 in these circumstances. Justice Breyer introduced this
example to highlight the fundamental importance of moral blameworthiness to
liability in criminal insanity jurisprudence.5 In Justice Breyer’s description,
because the accused, as a result of severe mental illness, thought that a dog
ordered him to kill the victim, the defendant did not know what he was doing
was wrong; therefore, such blameworthiness was absent, and a criminal
conviction should not follow.6
Justice Kagan’s majority opinion in Kahler referenced the same example.7
The associated discussion implied that, if the defendant believed their acts were
morally justified, insanity tests that include a failure to understand the moral
wrongfulness of the conduct would allow the defense to prevail, whether the
commander were God or a dog, as in the dissent’s example.8
At least since 1843, assuming that the conduct results from a qualifying
mental illness, insanity doctrine has provided potential legal recourse for a

1. Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S. Ct. 1021, 1038 (2020) (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer offered a similar,
but not identical, example in a dissent to a denial of certiorari in Delling v. Idaho, 568 U.S. 1038 (2012). The
example from the Delling case is discussed infra notes 132–39 and accompanying text.
2. 140 S. Ct. at 1038. In the dissent, the example was presented in declarative sentences rather than
presented in the form of a question as it appears here.
3. Id. Justice Breyer was joined in the dissent by Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor.
4. Id.
5. Id. (“Kansas has not simply redefined the insanity defense. Rather, it has eliminated the core of a
defense that has existed for centuries: that the defendant, due to mental illness, lacked the mental capacity
necessary for his conduct to be considered morally blameworthy.”). The example was one of a pair of examples
upon which Justice Breyer relied. Id. The example in the text focused on the moral incapacity prong of traditional
insanity tests. Id. The other example, where the defendant shoots a person believing the person is actually a dog,
related to a cognitive incapacity prong, which Kansas retained in its insanity approach. Id.
6. Id. at 1038, 1048 (“[T]he defendant . . . differ[s] from ordinary persons in ways that would lead most
of us to say that they should not be held morally responsible for their acts.”). The Kahler majority also suggests
that the dissent’s example includes a recognition that the defendant believes the response to the dog’s command
to be “morally justified[.]” Id. at 1036 (majority opinion). In addition, Justice Breyer writes that the dog-ascommander example “falls within [M’Naghten’s] second prong.” Id. at 1038 (Breyer, J., dissenting). This is the
prong relating to whether the defendant knew that their conduct was wrong. Queen v. M’Naghten, (1843) 8 Eng.
Rep. 718, 722 (HL). Moreover, because Justice Breyer is using the example to demonstrate the difficulty with
the Kansas approach, one might infer that the dissent intends that the defendant in the example does not know
their conduct to be wrong.
7. Id. at 1036 (majority opinion). Justice Kagan’s majority opinion was joined by Chief Justice Roberts
and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh.
8. See id. (“And the defendants they will treat differently are exactly those Kahler (and the dissent) focus
on: those who know exactly what they are doing (including that it is against the law) but believe it morally
justified—because, say, it is commanded by God (or in the dissent’s case, a dog).”) (citation omitted).
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defendant who did not, or was unable to, understand that the act they performed
was wrong.9 The seminal 1843 M’Naghten decision defines the wrongfulness
prong of legal insanity as: “at the time of the committing of the act, the party
accused was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the
mind . . . that he did not know he was doing what was wrong.”10 Consistent with
M’Naghten, approximately 90% of U.S. jurisdictions11 maintain some version

9. See Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 747–49 (2006); M’Naghten, 8 Eng. Rep. at 722. Pursuant to
M’Naghten, defendants can, in the alternative, show that they did not know the nature and quality of their act to
invoke legal insanity. Id. Justice Kagan’s majority opinion notes, however, that “[o]nly with M’Naghten, in
1843, did a court articulate, and momentum grow toward accepting, an insanity defense based independently on
moral incapacity.” Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1034. But see id. at 1040–45 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
10. M’Naghten, 8 Eng. Rep. at 722. Some scholars parse the M’Naghten case as articulating both a general
right and wrong test and a separate more specific rule that applies to delusions. See, e.g., E. Lea Johnston &
Vincent T. Leahey, The Status and Legitimacy of M’Naghten’s Insane Delusion Rule, 54 UC DAVIS L. REV.
1777, 1786 (2021) (noting that “whether the insane delusion rule merely provides an example of the general
right-and-wrong test, or whether it creates a distinct test for irresponsibility that could supplement the general
insanity standard or even detract from it” has provoked differing views) (footnote omitted)). For a detailed
analysis of this question and its impact, see generally Johnston & Leahey, supra note 10. For purposes of this
Article, the analysis treats M’Naghten’s commentary on partial delusions and the need to treat the facts as the
defendant perceived them as applicable here. This Article does not advance a normative view of how
wrongfulness should be defined nor of how legal insanity more generally should be codified.
11. The reference to U.S. jurisdictions in this Article encompasses those jurisdictions whose approaches to
insanity are described in the Appendix to Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1051–59, namely the approaches in the 50 states,
the federal government, and the District of Columbia. The approximately 90% statistic was calculated from the
dissent and Appendix in Kahler, in which 47 out of the 52 described jurisdictions appear to offer a
blameworthiness evaluation option. 140 S. Ct. at 1046. The majority opinion, however, characterizes the 2012
North Dakota statutory definition as “replacing the right-from-wrong test with an inquiry into whether the
defendant’s act arose from ‘[a] serious distortion of [his] capacity to recognize reality[.]’” Id. at 1035 (majority
opinion). If one adopts the majority’s assignment of North Dakota, then that would change the statistic to 88.46%
(46 of 52 jurisdictions). The dissent explains:
Today, 45 States, the Federal Government, and the District of Columbia continue to recognize
an insanity defense that retains some inquiry into the blameworthiness of the accused. Seventeen
States and the Federal Government use variants of the M’Naghten test, with its alternative cognitive
and moral incapacity prongs. Three States have adopted M’Naghten plus the volitional test. Ten
States recognize a defense based on moral incapacity alone. Thirteen States and the District of
Columbia have adopted variants of the Model Penal Code test, which combines volitional incapacity
with an expanded version of moral incapacity. See Appendix, infra. New Hampshire alone continues
to use the “product” test, asking whether “a mental disease or defect caused the charged conduct.”
State v. Fichera, 153 N. H. 588, 593, 903 A. 2d 1030, 1035 (2006). This broad test encompasses
“‘whether the defendant knew the difference between right and wrong and whether the defendant
acted impulsively,’” as well as “‘whether the defendant was suffering from delusions or
hallucinations.’” State v. Cegelis, 138 N. H. 249, 255, 638 A. 2d 783, 786 (1994). And North Dakota
uses a unique formulation that asks whether the defendant “lacks substantial capacity to comprehend
the harmful nature or consequences of the conduct, or the conduct is the result of a loss or serious
distortion of the individual’s capacity to recognize reality.” N. D. Cent. Code Ann. § 12.1–04.1–
01(1) (2012).
Of the States that have adopted the M’Naghten or Model Penal Code tests, some interpret
knowledge of wrongfulness to refer to moral wrong, whereas others hold that it means legal wrong.”).
See also Delling v. Idaho, (“The law has long recognized that criminal punishment is not appropriate
for those who, by reason of insanity, cannot tell right from wrong. See 4 W. Blackstone,
Commentaries on the Laws of England 24–25 (1769); [Queen v. M’Naghten, (1843) 8 Eng. Rep. 718
(HL)]. The insanity defense in nearly every State incorporates this principle. See Clark v. Arizona,
548 U.S. 735, 750–752 (2006) (noting that all but four States recognize some version of the insanity
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of this blameworthiness inquiry12 as a recognized excuse or defense to a criminal
conviction.13 Pursuant to this test, if, due to a qualifying mental illness, the
accused engaged in conduct without an ability to understand or understanding
that the act was wrong,14 as defined in that jurisdiction, the test could excuse the
defendant.15 In contrast, engaging in such conduct when the accused had an
ability to understand or understood that the act was indeed wrong, 16 generally
undermines an insanity excuse under this test.17
Justice Breyer describes the blameworthiness test as asking: “even if the
defendant knew what he was doing, did he have the capacity to know that it was
wrong?”18 But, then, without analysis of that wrongfulness issue in the dog-as-

defense); [R. BONNIE, A. COUGHLIN, J. JEFFRIES, & P. LOW, CRIMINAL LAW 604 (3d ed. 2010)]
(same).
Id. at 1046 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Delling v. Idaho, 568 U.S. 1038, 1038 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting
in denial of certiorari) (“The law has long recognized that criminal punishment is not appropriate for those who,
by reason of insanity, cannot tell right from wrong.”) (citations omitted).
12. Formulations differ on the precise terminology regarding awareness of wrongfulness. See, e.g., E. Lea
Johnston, Delusions, Moral Incapacity, and the Case for Moral Wrongfulness, 97 IND. L.J. 297, 308–16 (2022)
(exploring formulations at length, as well as much recent cognitive science research, and, overall, arguing for a
broader conception of wrongfulness in insanity law). Professor Johnston opines that “forensic mental health
examiners should consider the systemic, cognitive, and affective distortions associated with delusions, in
addition to delusions’ faulty content, in sanity evaluations and assess the extent they could have undermined a
defendant’s ability to understand the wrongfulness of her act.” Id. at 329. As noted above, M’Naghten uses
“know”; the Model Penal Code uses “substantial capacity to appreciate.” M‘Naghten, 8 Eng. Rep. at 722; MODEL
PENAL CODE § 4.01 (AM. L. INST. 1985). California refers to the defendant being “incapable of knowing or
understanding . . . or distinguishing right from wrong.” CAL. PENAL CODE § 25(b) (2020). Although the specific
formulation is important in application to real cases, that question is not central to the analysis here. To avoid
confusion, this Article refers primarily to “an ability or inability to understand.”
13. Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1046 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
14. Or a lack of substantial capacity to comprehend the harmful nature or consequences under the North
Dakota terminology. See N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-04.1-01(1) (West 2012).
15. See, e.g., Clark, 548 U.S. at 748. However, it is not clear whether the specific jurisdictional definition
of legal insanity is necessarily determinative in jury decisionmaking. See e.g., Randy Borum & Solomon M.
Fulero, Empirical Research on the Insanity Defense and Attempted Reforms: Evidence Toward Informed Policy,
23 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 375, 380 (1999) (describing research related, inter alia, to potential limitations in juror
comprehension of insanity instructions as well as conflicting evidence about the impact of actual changes in
insanity standards on jury decisionmaking).
16. As defined in that jurisdiction.
17. In the New Hampshire evaluation, whether the accused understood or could understand that the act
was wrong is only one of the factors a juror can evaluate in determining sanity. See State v. Cegelis, 638 A. 2d
783, 786 (1994). Consequently, perceiving the act to be morally unjustified would not necessarily lead to a sanity
finding. Moreover, not all jurisdictions focus on the defendant’s personal understanding of whether the conduct
was wrongful. Instead, a jurisdiction may substitute a societal evaluation of whether the conduct was wrongful
from the perspective of a reasonable person using the facts of the events as the defendant understood them. For
a discussion of the approach of such a jurisdiction, see infra note 77 and accompanying text.
18. Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1038–50. Justice Breyer does indicate that the M’Naghten formulation is not the
only possible one to describe the blameworthiness inquiry. Id. at 1039. He notes specifically that he “do[es] not
mean to suggest that M’Naghten’s particular approach to insanity is constitutionally required . . . M’Naghten’s
second prong is merely one way of describing something more fundamental. Its basic insight is that mental
illness may so impair a person’s mental capacities as to render him no more responsible for his actions than a
young child or a wild animal.” Id. Justice Breyer explains further that “[a]lthough English and early American
sources differ in their linguistic formulations of the legal test for insanity, with striking consistency, they all
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commander example, in the very next sentence, Justice Breyer summarily
announces that “[a]pplying this test to my example [of the dog commanding the
killing], a court would find that [the defendant] successfully established an
insanity defense.”19 As a result, the dissent effectively equates the defendant’s
illness-generated command hallucination with an inability to distinguish right
from wrong. While some forms of mental illness “can seriously impair a
sufferer’s ability rationally to appreciate the wrongfulness of conduct[,]”20
research on mental illness also suggests that command hallucinations can
sometimes be effectively ignored or resisted by the person experiencing them. 21
Consequently, the fact that someone suffers from command hallucinations does
not necessarily mean that they could not act within the confines of the law or
distinguish right from wrong at the time of the specific conduct.22
Professor Steven R. Smith also flags the problematic nature of Justice
Breyer’s example in a brief mention in an article reviewing the Kahler decision
when Professor Smith characterizes the dog example as “[a]n unfortunate” one
that “may somewhat confuse the issues…”23 He opines that “[a] defendant

express the same underlying idea: A defendant who, due to mental illness, lacks sufficient mental capacity to be
held morally responsible for his actions cannot be found guilty of a crime.” Id.
19. Id. at 1038.
20. Brief of American Psychiatric Ass’n. & American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law as Amici Curiae
in Support of Petitioner at 15, Delling v. Idaho, 568 U.S. 1038 (2012) (No. 11-1515) (“Psychiatrists’ clinical
experience, as well as the peer-reviewed research literature, support the conclusion that severe mental illness
can seriously impair a sufferer’s ability rationally to appreciate the wrongfulness of conduct.”); see also
Delling, 568 U.S. 1038 (Breyer, J., dissenting in denial of certiorari). For additional interpretations of Justice
Breyer’s example, see, for instance, infra notes 23–24 and accompanying text.
21. See, e.g., Paul Chadwick & Max Birchwood, The Omnipotence of Voices: A Cognitive Approach to
Auditory Hallucinations, 164 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 190, 190–95, 197, 200 (1994) (“In our group, the severity of
the command, and not beliefs, was the single most important determinant of compliance—there was no
compliance with life-threatening commands, and compliance with mild commands was commonplace.”).
Chadwick and Birchwood do note that “the belief that a voice comes from a powerful and vengeful spirit may
make the person terrified of the voice and comply with its commands to harm others; however, if the same voice
were construed as self-generated, the behaviour and affect might be quite different.” Id. at 190–91. Their study
focused on engaging participants in perceiving the voice as self-generated. Id. at 196.
22. See id.
23. Steven R. Smith, Supreme Court 2019–2020: Insanity, Discrimination, and DACA—and a Pandemic,
46 J. HEALTH SERV. PSYCH. 181, 182 (2020). In accompanying footnote 10, Professor Smith describes the
concern as follows:
The dissent raises an example of why the moral capacity branch matters. It imagines two
defendants, both charged with murder. They both have severe mental illness. The mental illness
causes the first defendant to think “the victim was a dog;” it causes the second to think “that a dog
ordered him to kill the victim. Under the insanity defense as traditionally understood, the government
cannot convict either defendant. Under Kansas’ rule, it can convict the second but not the first.”
There are not additional facts given in the hypothetical.
It is clear in the first example that wrongly believing the person is a dog would be a defense
because the defendant would not understand, given the delusion, that he is killing a person. As to the
second defendant, however, it is not so clear (absent unstated facts). The question essentially is, why
would a delusion that a dog told a defendant to kill a person implicate the moral capacity defense.
How would he be morally justified in killing the victim even if the dog had, in fact, ordered him to
do so?
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killing what he believes to be a person cannot legitimately (without more facts)
think he is morally or legally justified in doing so just because a dog ordered
him to do so.”24
In the majority’s version of the God and dog examples, the opinion
explicitly asserts that the defendant believed that the conduct was “morally
justified[.]”25 This provides express recognition that the defendant entertained a
perception with respect to the rectitude of their conduct that might play a role in
excusing it.26 Although not particular to a command hallucination, the opinion
even offers a scenario in which such a belief could excuse the defendant.27
However, by incorporating the dissent’s example of the dog’s command by
reference and treating it in that reference as if it were equivalent for purposes of
a wrongfulness evaluation to such a command by God, this Article contends that
the majority paints with too broad a brush.
To be fair, Justice Breyer’s dog-as-commander example is intended, as he
describes it, to be a “much simplified” one.28 It is one of two examples involving
a dog designed to provide a “conceptual”29 distinction between two prongs of a
traditional insanity test and to support Justice Breyer’s contention that the
Kansas test at issue in Kahler is missing the moral blameworthiness prong of
that test.30 Relatedly, Justice Kagan’s majority opinion’s brief incorporation by
reference of the dog example involves just that, not an extended approval of the
dog example, and appears intended to portray another important difference
between two types of wrongfulness (moral versus legal).31
Id. at 182 n.10 (citations omitted). For related concerns about Justice Breyer’s dog-as-commander
example, see Kent Scheidegger, An Insanity Debate Goes to the Dogs, CRIME & CONSEQUENCES (Mar. 23,
2020), https://www.crimeandconsequences.blog/?p=791 (arguing that the hypothetical “makes no
sense . . . . Nothing in Justice Breyer’s hypothetical negates the conclusion that Defendant Two knew that
it was wrong to kill the person.”); Rachel Tollefsrud, Saving the Insanity Defense: Insight into Personality
Disorders and the Necessary Elements of the Test, 48 MITCHELL HAMLINE L. REV. 372, 399 (2022)
(“[T]aking Justice Breyer’s example from his dissent in Kahler, a person who kills because a dog ‘told
them to’ has still murdered even though their reality is significantly skewed. In other words, this person
knows what they are doing, knows it is wrong, and probably is able to stop if they wanted to because the
reason they are committing the action—the why—is not wrapped up in their volition.”) (citing Scheidegger,
supra) (footnote omitted).
24. Smith, supra note 23, at 182 n.10.
25. Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1036 (majority opinion). For the majority’s treatment specifically of commands
perceived as emanating from God, see id. at 1026.
26. See id.
27. Id. (citing 2 JAMES F. STEPHEN, Relation of Madness to Crime, in HISTORY OF THE C RIMINAL LAW OF
ENGLAND 124, 149 (1883)).
28. Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1038 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1036 (majority opinion). The majority opinion also limits the moral capacity
inquiry to definitions that relate specifically to moral as opposed to legal wrong. See id. While one could contest
the exclusion of legal wrongfulness—which is arguably a variation of the blameworthiness inquiry—from the
canon of morality or blameworthiness inquiries, to respect the majority’s exclusion, critique of the majority
opinion here focuses on models that relate to moral wrongfulness, rather than those that focus on legal
wrongfulness. Because the dissent, however, contends that “[w]hile there is, of course, a logical distinction
between those interpretations, there is no indication that it makes a meaningful difference in practice. The two
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Nonetheless, as this Article argues and aims to illustrate, by using the
impoverished example of the dog-as-commander without the necessary critical
analysis of wrongfulness, both the majority and the dissent risk exacerbating the
confusion surrounding the complex doctrine of wrongfulness in insanity law.
Insanity law, like much of criminal law, lies largely within the purview of
local or state legislation and interpretation,32 but can, nonetheless, be subject to
constitutional limits.33 James Kahler called upon this constitutional oversight
power with a due process challenge to Kansas’ statutory framework on
insanity.34 “Kahler . . . asked th[e] Court to decide whether the Due Process
Clause require[d] States to provide an insanity defense that acquits a defendant
who could not ‘distinguish right from wrong’ when committing his crime—or,
otherwise put, whether that Clause require[s] States to adopt the moralincapacity test from M’Naghten.”35 The Court ultimately found that Kansas
could remain an outlier; despite its failure to offer a traditional version of the
moral incapacity defense, its approach did not violate the Due Process Clause.36
To reach a decision on that question, the Kahler case produced opinions
that examine at length the concept of wrongfulness in insanity and its treatment

inquiries are closely related and excuse roughly the same universe of defendants[,]” the critique of the dissent
also involves a critique under a legal wrongfulness approach. Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1046 (Breyer, J., dissenting);
see also infra note 54 and accompanying text.
32. Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1028 (majority opinion) (“Within broad limits, . . . ‘doctrine[s] of criminal
responsibility’ must remain ‘the province of the States.’”) (citation omitted). Federal criminal prosecutions are,
of course, subject to congressional definitions of insanity. See United States v. Ewing, 494 F.3d 607, 615–16
(7th Cir. 2007) (“Under the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984 (“‘IDRA’”), it is an affirmative defense to a
prosecution for a federal crime if ‘at the time of the commission of the acts constituting the offense, the
defendant, as a result of a severe mental disease or defect, was unable to appreciate the nature and quality or the
wrongfulness of his acts.’”) (citation omitted). But federal cases represent a very small percentage of criminal
cases nationwide. Compare Admin. Off. of the U.S. Cts., Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 2020, U.S. District
Courts, Criminal Filings, U.S. CTS, https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/federal-judicial-caseloadstatistics-2020 (noting 93,213 federal criminal defendant filings in U.S. district courts in 2020) (last visited Apr.
15, 2022) with CSP STAT Criminal, Trial Court Caseload Overview, Caseload Detail – Total Criminal, 2020
Incoming Cases, CT. STATS. PROJECT, https://www.courtstatistics.org/csp-stat-nav-cards-first-row/csp-statcriminal (last visited Apr. 15, 2022) (noting 9,244,371 state court incoming cases in 32 states in 2020). In
addition, commentators note the infrequency with which the insanity defense is successful. See, e.g., Eugene M.
Fahey, Laura Groschadl & Brianna Weaver, “The Angels that Surrounded My Cradle”: The History, Evolution,
and Application of the Insanity Defense, 68 BUFF. L. REV. 805, 807–08 (2020) (“In the State of New York, of
approximately five thousand murder cases between 2007 and 2016, just six ended with the defendant found not
responsible by reason of mental disease or defect; the state does not track how often the defense is raised.
Between 2013 and 2017, only eleven defendants out of 19,041 felony and misdemeanor trials conducted in the
state were found not responsible by reason of mental disease or defect pursuant to Penal Law § 40.15, and 241
defendants entered an insanity plea out of 1,375,096 convictions during the same time period. As of June 30,
2018, 260 insanity acquittees were receiving treatment in secure confinement and another 452 insanity acquittees
‘were in the community subject to orders of conditions.’”) (footnotes omitted).
33. Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1027 (“Under well-settled precedent, a state rule about criminal liability—laying
out either the elements of or the defenses to a crime—violates due process only if it ‘offends some principle of
justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.’”) (citation
omitted).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1037.
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in various jurisdictions.37 While these extended analyses of wrongfulness are not
the holding of the Kahler case,38 they are, nonetheless, critical for the
approximately nine-tenths of jurisdictions nationwide that allow some form of
inability to understand wrongfulness to excuse.39 In these analyses, both the
majority and dissent invoke the example of the dog’s command to kill.40
This Article explores whether the dog’s command to commit homicide
should qualify as legal insanity under a wrongfulness analysis. 41 The argument

37. Id. at 1024–50.
38. The holding in Kahler was on the constitutional due process issue, not on the definitions of
wrongfulness. Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1037. However, as, for example, California appellate courts have noted with
respect to that state’s supreme court, “[e]ven if properly characterized as dictum, statements of the Supreme
Court should be considered persuasive.” Hubbard v. Superior Court, 66 Cal. App. 4th 1163, 1169 (1997)
(quoting United Steelworkers of Am. v. Bd. of Educ. 162 Cal. App. 3d 823, 835 (1984)).
39. Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1051–59 (Appendix).
40. See, e.g., Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1036 (majority opinion); id. at 1038, 1048 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
41. Justice Breyer analyzes two versions of the dog analogy, one under each of the two prongs of the
M’Naghten test. Kahler, 140 S. Ct. 1021, 1038. The first M’Naghten prong involves determining whether the
defendant understood the “‘nature and quality of the act he was doing . . .’” Id. (quoting Lord Chief Judge Tindal
in M’Naghten’s Case, (1843) 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (HL)). The version of the dog analogy that Justice Breyer
relates to this first M’Naghten prong and the analysis of the first prong itself are not the subject of this Article.
The second version, the one provided at the start of this Article, relates to the second M’Naghten prong, the
wrongfulness question, and is the focus of this Article. For background and easy reference, what follows are
excerpts of key pertinent discussions of both versions of the dog analogy and the prongs to which each refers
from Justice Breyer’s dissent in Kahler:
A much-simplified example will help the reader understand the conceptual distinction that is central
to this case. Consider two similar prosecutions for murder. In Prosecution One, the accused person
has shot and killed another person. The evidence at trial proves that, as a result of severe mental
illness, he thought the victim was a dog. Prosecution Two is similar but for one thing: The evidence
at trial proves that, as a result of severe mental illness, the defendant thought that a dog ordered him
to kill the victim. Under the insanity defense as traditionally understood, the government cannot
convict either defendant. Under Kansas’ rule, it can convict the second but not the first.
To put the matter in more explicitly legal terms, consider the most famous statement of the traditional
insanity defense, that contained in M’Naghten’s Case. Lord Chief Justice Tindal, speaking for a
majority of the judges of the common-law courts, described the insanity defense as follows:
“[T]o establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the time of the
committing of the act, the party accused was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease
of the mind, [1] as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, [2] if he did know
it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong.”
The first prong (sometimes referred to as “cognitive incapacity”) asks whether the defendant knew
what he was doing. This prong corresponds roughly to the modern concept of mens rea for many
offenses. The second (sometimes referred to as “moral incapacity”) goes further. It asks, even if the
defendant knew what he was doing, did he have the capacity to know that it was wrong? Applying
this test to my example, a court would find that both defendants successfully established an insanity
defense. Prosecution One (he thought the victim was a dog) falls within M’Naghten’s first prong,
while Prosecution Two (he thought the dog ordered him to do it) falls within its second prong.
In Kansas’ early years of statehood, its courts recognized the M’Naghten test as the “cardinal rule of
responsibility in the criminal law.” . . . . But in 1995, Kansas “‘legislatively abolish[ed] the insanity
defense.’” Under the new provision, a criminal defendant’s mental disease or defect is relevant to his
guilt or innocence only insofar as it shows that he lacked the intent defined as an element of the
offense, or mens rea. If the defendant acted with the required level of intent, then he has no defense
based on mental illness.
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unfolds in two parts. First, the Article furnishes a doctrinal and conceptual
overview of wrongfulness in the insanity context.42 Based on that foundation,
the Article evaluates the problematic assertion that obeying a dog’s command to
kill, one that derives from a qualifying mental illness, even if it involves a
defendant’s claim of rectitude, per se merits recognition as legal insanity. It
concludes that determining whether wrongfulness should excuse depends upon
more than whether the defendant suffers from a severe mental illness that
generated a command hallucination that caused the conduct and whether they
believed they were morally justified. In particular, that determination should
involve inquiries about which model or variation of wrongfulness the
jurisdiction applies to evaluate insanity claims and why the defendant acted.
I. OVERVIEW OF WRONGFULNESS IN LEGAL INSANITY
With respect to distinguishing right from wrong, Justice Kagan’s majority
opinion notes that the Supreme Court has “labeled [this prong of]
M’Naghten . . . a test of ‘moral capacity,’ and invoked the oft-used phrase
‘telling right from wrong’ (or in older language, good from evil) to describe its
central inquiry.”43 Yet, in legal sanity evaluations, “wrongfulness” remains a
term of myriad and sometimes elusive meanings.44 It lies at the evolving
intersection of legal standards of wrongfulness and the complex human
dynamics of serious mental illness.45 Efforts to delineate the genealogy and
Under Kansas’ changed law, the defendant in Prosecution One could defend against the charge by
arguing that his mental illness prevented him from forming the mental state required for murder
(intentional killing of a human being)—just as any defendant may attempt to rebut the State’s prima
facie case for guilt. The defendant in Prosecution Two has no defense. Because he acted with the
requisite level of intent, he must be convicted regardless of any role his mental illness played in his
conduct. See [State v. Wetrich, 307 Kan. 374, 401, 410 P.3d 105, 125 (2018)] (acknowledging that
Kansas’ mens rea approach “allows conviction of an individual who had no capacity to know that
what he or she was doing was wrong”).
Id. at 1038–39 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
“Now ask, what moral difference exists between the defendants in the two examples? Assuming
equivalently convincing evidence of mental illness, I can find none at all. In both cases, the
defendants differ from ordinary persons in ways that would lead most of us to say that they should
not be held morally responsible for their acts. I cannot find one defendant more responsible than the
other. And for centuries, neither has the law.”
Id. at 1048.
While M’Naghten offered a potential insanity option for both examples, one might argue that shooting a person
believing that person to be a dog involves important but different moral (homicide versus animal cruelty)
evaluations than if the defendant knew it were a person. In the second example, the moral recognition and
evaluation of committing homicide remain, even if one is moved to commit that act through the delusion that
the dog commanded it. See Smith, supra note 23.
42. The models discussed infra at notes 60–96 and accompanying text are drawn primarily from Kate E.
Bloch & Jeffrey Gould, Legal Indeterminacy in Insanity Cases: Clarifying Wrongfulness and Applying a Triadic
Approach to Forensic Evaluations, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 913 (2016).
43. Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1035 (majority opinion).
44. See e.g., State v. Crenshaw, 659 P.2d 488, 491 (Wash. 1983) (“The definition of the term ‘wrong’ in
the M’Naghten test has been considered and disputed by many legal scholars.”).
45. See, e.g., Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1028–29, 1037.
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applicable models for interpreting wrongfulness in this context populate court
opinions and scholarly tomes.46 As the Supreme Court noted in Kahler, even
though scholars and jurists refer to this evaluation as one of moral capacity,
jurisdictions incorporate more than one doctrinal option for evaluating
wrongfulness.47 Specifically, the Court identified two rubrics for interpretation:
moral wrong and legal wrong.48 Both derive directly or indirectly from at least
as far back as the test codified in M’Naghten.49
Commentators, however, challenge these rubrics on at least two related
grounds.50 First, they ask whether, under the moral wrong approach, consensus
morals or norms actually exist in our culturally diverse population today.51
Second, and sometimes in response to the first criticism, some jurists argue that
the two rubrics are, in effect, practically congruent and that distinguishing
between moral and legal wrong is unnecessary.52 To address the criticism of a
lack of moral consensus, commentators, including a number of courts, opine that
“most cases in which the insanity defense is raised involve crimes sufficiently
serious such that society’s moral judgment regarding the accused’s conduct will
be identical to the legal standard reflected in the applicable criminal statute.”53
Or, as Justice Breyer argued in the Kahler dissent: “While there is, of course, a
logical distinction between those interpretations [moral versus legal wrong],
there is no indication that it makes a meaningful difference in practice. The two
inquiries are closely related and excuse roughly the same universe of
defendants.”54 In effect, if they were almost identical, then legal codes could

46. See, e.g., Brandon A. Yakush & Melinda Wolbransky, Insanity and the Definition of Wrongfulness in
California, 13 J. FORENSIC PSYCH. PRAC. 355 (2013); United States v. Ewing, 494 F.3d 607, 616 (7th Cir. 2007)
(“In the context of the insanity defense, courts and scholars have generally proposed three alternative definitions
for the term: (1) legal wrongfulness, as in ‘contrary to law’; (2) moral wrongfulness, as in ‘contrary to public
morality,’ determined objectively by reference to society’s condemnation of the act as morally wrong; or (3)
moral wrongfulness, as in ‘contrary to personal morality,’ determined subjectively by reference to the
defendant’s belief that his action was morally justified (even if he appreciated that it was illegal or contrary to
public morality).”). For a more general condemnation of the state of insanity law and a proposal for a somewhat
different role for mental illness in criminal responsibility, see Christopher Slobogin, An End to Insanity:
Recasting the Role of Mental Disability in Criminal Cases, 86 VA. L. REV. 1199, 1200 (2000) (“[M]ental illness
should be relevant in assessing culpability only as warranted by general criminal law doctrines concerning mens
rea, self-defense and duress.”).
47. Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1025.
48. Id. (“But over the years, 16 States have reoriented the test to focus on the defendant’s understanding
that his act was illegal— that is, legally rather than morally “wrong.”).
49. Id. The origin of the moral capacity test itself was the subject of much discussion in Kahler. See, e.g.,
id. at 1029, 1034; id. at 1040–45 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
50. See, e.g., Bloch & Gould, supra note 42, at 931.
51. Id.
52. See, e.g., Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1046 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
53. State v. Cole, 755 A.2d 202, 210 (Conn. 2000).
54. Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1046 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Similarly, later in the dissent, Justice Breyer
contends that “the rule adopted by some States that a defendant must be acquitted if he was unable to appreciate
the legal wrongfulness of his acts, would likely lead to acquittal in the mine run of such cases.” Id. at 1049
(citation omitted).
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supply the societal moral norms, and that would diminish concern about a lack
of moral consensus.
Justice Breyer is correct that many cases will produce congruent results,
but an important subset of cases will not. Justice Kagan’s majority opinion offers
an excerpted scenario, drawn from English authority James Fitzjames Stephen,
to illustrate where there would likely be a disparity:
“A kills B knowing that he is killing B, and knowing that it is illegal to kill B,
but under an insane delusion that the salvation of the human race will be
obtained by . . . the murder of B[.] A’s act is a crime if the word ‘wrong’ [in
M’Naghten] means illegal. It is not a crime if the word wrong means morally
wrong.”55

Stephen’s example, although offering a relatively brief scenario, 56
illustrates the importance of recognizing that the choice between the moral and
legal definitions of “wrong” could produce opposite outcomes. In Stephen’s
1883 analysis, consistent with doctrine at that time, the legal defense of necessity
was not generally recognized as a justification for murder.57 Under Stephen’s
analysis (assuming no necessity defense) the murder remains legally wrong,
even though, in a moral sphere, the excerpt suggests that the need to save the
human race can serve as a moral excuse for the conduct. Thus, Stephen’s
hypothetical exemplifies the need to recognize both moral and legal wrong
rubrics. In addition, the example undergirds the importance of understanding
why the defendant engaged in the conduct at issue (effort to save the human
race). This offers some insight into the defendant’s motivation for their conduct
and allows us to consider how their conduct relates to morality. This insight and
consideration are largely absent from the Kahler dissent’s dog-as-commander
example that inspires this Article.58
The moral and legal wrong rubrics lay the foundation for our doctrinal
analysis. These are essential starting points. But finer gradations of these rubrics

55. Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1036 (majority opinion) (quoting STEPHEN, supra note 27, at 149).
56. In the context of the analysis below, the scenario in the majority opinion might benefit from greater
specificity. For instance, the example does not explicitly treat the question of whether the perception of morality
is from a societal or personal perspective or both. Nor does the majority’s description indicate that the delusion
caused A to understand or believe that society would not condemn the act. Interestingly, the majority’s rendition
represents only an excerpt of Stephen’s example. In Stephen’s original text, the example read as follows:
“(3.) A kills B knowing that he is killing B, and knowing that it is illegal
“to kill B, but under an insane delusion that the salvation of the human race
“will be obtained by his execution for the murder of B, and that God has
“commanded him (A) to produce that result by those means. A’s act is a
“crime if the word ‘wrong’ means illegal. It is not a crime if the word
“wrong means morally wrong.
STEPHEN, supra note 27, at 149. The example in its entirety raises the question of implementing a command that
the defendant perceives as initiated by God. For a discussion of that consideration more specifically, see infra
notes 125–127 and accompanying text.
57. See, e.g., Queen v. Dudley & Stephens (1884) 14 QBD 273 (DC).
58. See Justice Breyer’s treatment of the example in Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1038, 1048, 1049 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
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inform both the conceptual approaches and real-world applications.59
Consequently, for purposes of this analysis, the work further divides each of the
moral and legal wrong rubrics into two models.60 The difference between the
models within each rubric depends on the extent to which they focus internally
on the defendant’s world or externally on society’s reality, legal codes, or norms.
Both sets of models begin with an internal focus where the defendant’s
perception of the facts of the event, no matter how distorted by their mental
illness, governs. As explained in the M’Naghten decision, particularly in the
context of partial delusions,61 the defendant “must be considered in the same
situation as to responsibility as if the facts with respect to which the delusion
exists were real.”62
In real-world sanity evaluations, the evaluator must assess whether the
defendant actually believed the version of events proffered by the defense.63 The
analysis here assumes that the description offered of the defendant’s reality is
what the defendant actually perceived at the time the relevant acts occurred.64 It
also assumes that the defendant’s qualifying mental illness caused the defendant
to perceive reality in that way and prompted the defendant’s act. 65 These
assumptions meet two threshold criteria at the heart of insanity doctrine: that the
defendant experienced a qualifying mental illness and that the illness caused the
conduct at issue.66
Beyond the internally-focused version of the facts common to all these
wrongfulness models, the models diverge with respect to the frame for morality
and legality. One pair of models focuses on evaluation in a moral context and
the other pair on evaluation with respect to the law. Within the moral wrong
rubric, the paradigm posits an internal facts-external morality (“external
morality”) model and an internal facts-internal morality (“internal morality”)
model. Does the evaluation relate to society’s morals67 or instead to the
defendant’s own morals? Within the legal wrong rubric, the paradigm posits a
relatively analogous pair of models.68 Does the evaluation depend on society’s
law or on the defendant’s perception of the law?
59. See infra notes 67–96 and accompanying text.
60. For a more detailed presentation and analysis of these models, see Bloch & Gould, supra note 42, at
925–40.
61. See Johnston & Leahey, supra note 10.
62. Queen v. M’Naghten (1843) 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (HL).
63. Bloch & Gould, supra note 42, at 924.
64. For real-world insanity claims, evaluators will generally compare the defendant’s account with
collateral documentation or other information, which may support or refute the version of events advanced by
the defendant in response to the criminal charges.
65. Bloch & Gould, supra note 42, at 923.
66. Id.
67. As discussed infra note 77, and accompanying text, in some external morality applications, the focus
is on taking the facts as the defendant understood them and asking if a reasonable person in that situation would
have understood the conduct as morally wrongful.
68. This set of models represents a subset of the models proposed in Bloch & Gould, supra note 42, at
925–40.
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A. MORAL WRONG MODELS
In the moral wrong category, an external morality model commonly
focuses on whether the defendant understood that the conduct, based on the facts
as perceived by the defendant, would violate society’s morals or norms.69 This
anchors the analysis in an external referent, recognizing that there are morals
outside the defendant’s internally-constructed view against which to measure
the “good or evil” of conduct.
For example, a defendant might understand that, in general, the conduct is
morally wrong—for instance, the intentional killing of another human being is
wrong—but might believe that, if society had the defendant’s “special
knowledge,” society would approve of the conduct. Stephen’s excerpted
hypothetical could fall into this category. There, the defendant’s mental illness
caused him to believe that the homicide was necessary for “the salvation of the
human race.”70 If, as a result of his special knowledge, the defendant believed
that society would approve of his conduct or society deemed his conduct morally
acceptable, then this example could lead to a successful invocation of an external
morality wrongfulness claim.71
Juxtaposed against a successful invocation of an external morality model
to find insanity, a defendant might instead personally believe their conduct was
morally justified but accurately perceive that society would not approve of their
actions. This might arise, for example, when there is no claim of special
knowledge.72 An external morality model does not generally contemplate
excusing this conduct.
69. Bloch & Gould, supra note 42, at 931–36.
70. Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S. Ct. 1021, 1036 (2020) (citing STEPHEN, supra note 27, at 149).
71. Cf. State v. Wilson, 700 A.2d 633, 640, 643 (Conn. 1997) (“Although we agree with the state that the
proper test must incorporate principles of societal morality, we conclude that the state’s interpretation of the
cognitive prong of § 53a–13 (a) does not sufficiently account for a delusional defendant’s own distorted
perception of society’s moral standards. Accordingly, we conclude that a defendant may establish that he lacked
substantial capacity to appreciate the ‘wrongfulness’ of his conduct if he can prove that, at the time of his criminal
act, as a result of mental disease or defect, he substantially misperceived reality and harbored a delusional belief
that society, under the circumstances as the defendant honestly but mistakenly understood them, would not have
morally condemned his actions. . . . The trial court should inform the jury that a person may establish that he
was legally insane if he proves that, at the time he committed the prohibited conduct, due to mental disease or
defect he suffered from a misperception of reality and, in acting on the basis of that misperception, he did not
have the substantial capacity to appreciate that his actions were contrary to societal morality, even though he
may have been aware that the conduct in question was criminal. The trial court should instruct the jury further
that, in deciding whether the defendant had substantial capacity to appreciate that his conduct was contrary to
societal morality, it must not limit its inquiry merely to the defendant’s appreciation that society, objectively
speaking, condemned his actions. Rather, the jury should be instructed that it must also determine whether the
defendant maintained a sincere belief that society would condone his actions under the circumstances as the
defendant honestly perceived them. Finally, the trial court also should instruct the jury that, if it finds that the
defendant had the substantial capacity to appreciate that his conduct both violated the criminal law and was
contrary to society’s moral standards, even under the circumstances as he honestly perceives them, then he
should not be adjudged legally insane simply because, as a result of mental disease or defect, he elected to follow
his own personal moral code.”).
72. Perhaps the defendant recognizes that intentional homicide violates society’s morals, but they feel
compelled or an “irresistible impulse” to engage in the conduct. Although traditional moral wrongfulness
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Jurisdictions have developed variations of the external morality model. 73
For example, the Connecticut Supreme Court endorses a version in which a
defendant can be found legally insane if the defendant “substantially
misperceived reality and harbored a delusional belief that society, under the
circumstances as the defendant honestly but mistakenly understood them, would
not have morally condemned his actions . . . .” 74 In the Connecticut version, a
distorted perception of reality can extend not only to the factual circumstances
of the conduct, but also to the defendant’s understanding of what moral
standards society actually holds.75 In such a jurisdiction, the defendant can
qualify for legal insanity on the basis of their delusional view of the facts and
their potentially inaccurate view about whether society would approve of the
conduct.76
In contrast, the Hawai’i Supreme Court has adopted a variation of the
external morality model in which the jurisdiction asks “whether the defendant
appreciated the wrongfulness of his conduct from the point of view of a
reasonable person in the defendant’s position under the circumstances as he
believed them to be.”77 This variation of the external morality model starts with
the defendant’s perceived facts but shifts the focus away from the defendant’s
actual perception of morality and substitutes the perception of a reasonable
person in the defendant’s position. Here, although the facts of the incident may
result from the delusion, it appears that only a reasonable person’s perspective
(and perhaps only reasonable mistakes) about morality and wrongfulness would
be permitted to sustain an insanity claim.
Turning from state to federal treatment, in interpreting wrongfulness in the
federal Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984 (IDRA), the Seventh Circuit
approved an instruction that asked “‘whether the defendant appreciated that his

analyses do not support an insanity defense in these circumstances, jurisdictions that include an “irresistible
impulse” provision could support an insanity defense here. “The volitional incapacity or irresistible-impulse test,
which surfaced over two centuries ago (first in England, then in this country), asks whether a person was so
lacking in volition due to a mental defect or illness that he could not have controlled his actions.” Clark v.
Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 749 (2006) (footnotes omitted). Approximately 17 jurisdictions incorporate an irresistible
impulse test (defendant cannot conform their conduct to the law). See Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1051–59 (Appendix):
1051, 1052–54, 1056–57. Others reject that test explicitly. See, e.g., State v. Cordasco, 66 A.2d 27, 31 (1949)
(“Insanity varying from this legal concept will not suffice as a defense and one who kills because of an irresistible
impulse cannot seek an acquittal on that basis.”); CAL. PENAL CODE § 28(b) (2003) (“As a matter of public policy
there shall be no defense of diminished capacity, diminished responsibility, or irresistible impulse in a criminal
action or juvenile adjudication hearing.”).
73. See e.g., Wilson, 700 A.2d at 643; State v. Uyesugi, 60 P.3d 843, 856 (Haw. 2002).
74. Wilson, 700 A.2d at 640, 643.
75. Id.; see also Yakush & Wolbransky, supra note 46, at 364.
76. However, by inquiring into the defendant’s perception of society’s approval of the conduct, the
Connecticut version does maintain an external referent.
77. Uyesugi, 60 P.3d at 856 (“[W]e adopt a . . . subjective/objective rule [that] would determine whether
the defendant appreciated the wrongfulness of his conduct from the point of view of a reasonable person in the
defendant’s position under the circumstances as he believed them to be.”).
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conduct was contrary to public morality.’”78 This version also incorporates an

external referent involving society’s perspective on the wrongfulness of the act
in question.
In contrast to an external morality model, an internal morality model
focuses on whether the defendant believed that their conduct was morally
justified under their own moral values. The Ninth Circuit in United States v.
Segna described this approach to wrongfulness as being “‘contrary to one’s own
conscience.’”79 Segna, which predated the federal IDRA, 80 affirmed that,
pursuant to the then existing doctrine, this type of internal morality model was
the legally appropriate one.81 Moreover, in 1999, fifteen years after the 1984
passage of the IDRA, a federal district court judge continued to find it
appropriate to include analysis under an internal morality model82 as one of three
possible federal options, even as the court explicitly recognized that the internal
morality evaluation was not likely to be the applicable one. 83
Under an internal morality model, one might imagine, for example, a
defendant who entertained a delusion, induced by a qualifying mental illness,
that individuals with tattoos of a serpent were conspiring to control their life. In
their delusional state, while having a dental cleaning, they see that the dental
hygienist has a serpent tattoo and believe that the hygienist is installing a
surveillance device in the defendant’s teeth. As a result of the delusion, the
defendant then grabs a cleaning instrument and assaults the hygienist. Assume
that, under the defendant’s personal moral code, violent prevention of the

78. United States v. Ewing, 494 F.3d 607, 612 (7th Cir. 2007); see also Yakush & Wolbransky, supra note
46, at 364. In a footnote, Yakush & Wolbransky opine that “it appears the federal system utilizes only an
objective standard of morality. This is unlike California, which still allows the fact finder to assess both the
defendant’s subjective (whether he truly believed his act to be justified) and an objective standard (whether he
understood that society would believe his act to be justified).” Id. at 364 n.13 (citation omitted).
79. United States v. Segna, 555 F.2d 226, 232 (9th Cir. 1977) (“Under this ‘subjective’ approach, the
accused is not criminally responsible for his offending act if, because of mental disease or defect, he believes
that he is morally justified in his conduct even though he may appreciate either that his act is criminal or that it
is contrary to public morality.”).
80. Insanity Defense, Insanity Defense Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 17(a) (1984) (“It is an affirmative defense
to a prosecution under any Federal statute that, at the time of the commission of the acts constituting the offense,
the defendant, as a result of a severe mental disease or defect, was unable to appreciate the nature and quality or
the wrongfulness of his acts. Mental disease or defect does not otherwise constitute a defense.”).
81. Segna, 555 F.2d at 232. The court in Segna was interpreting a version of the insanity standard modeled
on a test developed by the American Law Institute (ALI) and relied on commentary from the ALI. See Segna,
555 F.2d at 232–33. The IDRA, however, did not adopt the ALI test. See infra note 84.
82. United States v. Danser, 110 F. Supp. 2d 807, 826–29 (S.D. Ind. 1999). The court does not use the
terminology of this Article. Instead, the Danser court describes this model as “involving a purely subjective
standard of morality[.]” Id. at 826, n.13.
83. Danser, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 827–29 (analyzing wrongfulness under the equivalent of external legality,
external morality, and internal morality models and noting that the defendant “was able to appreciate the
wrongfulness of his acts. This conclusion holds true regardless of which definition of ‘wrongfulness’ (as the
term appears in 18 U.S.C. § 17) is used.”). The Danser court noted that, because of the passage of the IDRA, “it
seems only logical that Congress would not have intended the most expansive definition of ‘wrongfulness’
(under an already expansive insanity rule)—involving a purely subjective standard of morality—to now apply.”
Id. at 826, n.13.
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implantation of a surveillance device was morally acceptable. Even if the
defendant understood that society would view the conduct as illegal and criminal
and would morally disapprove of the conduct, under an internal morality model,
the defendant could be found insane.
Research suggests that courts have moved away from an internal morality
model, and it is not clear that federal or state insanity doctrine currently officially
adopts this approach.84 Still, because it provides a logical possibility and due to
its historical doctrinal recognition, this model offers a useful rubric for analysis
and contrast to the external morality model.
B. LEGAL WRONG MODELS
Turning now from the two moral wrong to the two legal wrong models, we
look first to an external legality approach. This would commonly involve
ascertaining whether the defendant understood or could understand that the
conduct violated society’s law or was criminal. As a general rule, the defendant
does not need to know the name of the crime or the specific law in question.85
If, despite their mental illness, at the time of the act, the defendant understood
or could understand that their conduct violated the law, this should generally
result in rejection of the insanity defense under an external legality model.

84. See, e.g., Ewing, 494 F.3d at 616–19 (“Ewing relies primarily on United States v. Segna, a decision by
the Ninth Circuit, the only court to have adopted a subjective definition of wrongfulness like the one in Ewing’s
proposed instruction. There are a number of problems with reliance on Segna. First, the case predates the
codification of the federal insanity defense and instead interprets wrongfulness as used in the Model Penal
Code’s definition of legal insanity. That definition states: ‘A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at
the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate
the criminality (wrongfulness) of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.’ Segna relied
principally on commentary from the American Legal Institute (‘ALI’) accompanying the formulation of this
definition. But Congress did not adopt the Model Penal Code’s definition of insanity when it enacted the IDRA.
Accordingly, neither the ALI commentary nor cases relying upon it are appropriate sources for interpretation of
the statute. Moreover, although there is far from a robust body of case law on the issue, Segna’s subjective
definition of wrongfulness-even in the context of § 4.01 of the Model Penal Code has been rejected by those
courts to consider it since. . . . Accordingly, ‘criminality’ or ‘contrary to law’ is too narrow a definition of
wrongfulness, and “subjective personal morality” is too broad. The second of the alternative definitions of
wrongfulness-contrary to objective societal or public morality-best comports with the rules established in
M’Naghten’s Case.”) (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted).
For an analysis by the Connecticut Supreme Court rejecting the internal moral wrongfulness approach, see
State v. Wilson, 700 A.2d 633, 640 (Conn. 1997) (“We conclude that the defendant’s efforts to define morality
in purely personal terms are inconsistent with the Model Penal Code, judicial precedent, and the assumptions
underlying our criminal law. . . . Although the rejection under the Model Penal Code of the personal standard is
not beyond debate, we conclude that the drafters of § 4.01 did not intend that a defendant who appreciates both
the illegality and the societal immorality of his actions be relieved of criminal responsibility due to his purely
personal, albeit delusional, moral code. Moreover, the large majority of other jurisdictions that have considered
the cognitive prong of the insanity defense has chosen a societal, rather than a personal, standard.”) (citations
omitted) (footnotes omitted).
85. See, e.g., State v. Hamann, 285 N.W.2d 180, 183 (Iowa 1979) (“This is not to say, as has sometimes
been suggested, that sanity would thereby be measured by legal knowledge. The test is not how much law a
person claiming an insanity defense actually knows. The determination is to be made on the basis of a person’s
ability to understand it when something is prohibited by law.”).
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In contrast, under this model, the defendant could advance a legal
justification or excuse that the defendant believed applied to their view of the
facts and argue that, because of that justification, the defendant did not perceive
the conduct as violating the law. If, with the facts as the defendant believed them
to be, the conduct would not constitute a crime, an insanity defense could lie. 86
A variation of Stephen’s example of the homicide motivated by a need to
save the human race, but in which the defendant does not understand the conduct
to be legally wrong, could illustrate this situation.87 Although in Stephen’s era,
under some circumstances, a need to save the human race could have provided
a moral but not legal excuse88 (because, inter alia, the legal defense of necessity
did not generally extend to murder),89 some jurisdictions today might permit the
legal doctrine of necessity to justify (or mitigate) an intentional homicide. 90
Under an external legality model in such a jurisdiction, a defendant who believes
their conduct is legally justified91 and whose conduct, with the facts as the
defendant understood them, meets the elements of that justification should be
able to successfully invoke an insanity claim.92 In this external legality model,
the focus is on evaluation of whether the defendant’s delusional state about the
facts of the events, “if true, would lawfully justify” 93 the conduct. Under this
formulation, the distortions that permit successful invocation of the defense
generally extend only to the facts, not to the defendant’s understanding of the
jurisdiction’s legal rules.
Within the context of legal wrongfulness, in contrast to the external legality
model, one might posit the second model, an internal legality model, where the
evaluation of the legal standard looks internally to the defendant’s conception of
society’s rules.94 This anticipates that the trier of fact would apply the
86. See Queen v. M’Naghten, (1843) 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (HL).
87. However, one would probably have to assume some additional facts, for example, the threat to
extinguish the human race was clear and imminent, and there were no other legal alternatives to the defendant’s
conduct.
88. See generally Queen v. Dudley & Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. 273 DC (1884) (finding that necessity did not
justify intentional homicide).
89. See id.
90. See Wood v. State, 271 S.W.3d 329, 334 (Tex. 2008) (“The jury was charged with finding Wood guilty
of murder or, in the alternative, guilty of the lesser included offense of manslaughter, or not guilty. Murder is
defined as intentionally or knowingly causing the death of another. Looking at the plain language of section
19.02, we do not perceive any legislative purpose indicating that the necessity defense is not available.”)
(footnotes omitted) (citation omitted).
91. Whether the defendant actually needs to believe that their conduct is legally justified, or whether the
conduct just needs to meet the elements of the legal justification based on the defendant’s perception of the facts,
might be subject to debate or different variations of the external legality model.
92. For a functional application of an external legality model in a self-defense, rather than a necessity
context, see, for example, People v. Leeds, 240 Cal. App. 4th 822, 824 (Cal. 2015) (holding that, in determining
whether a defendant, who believed he was legally justified, could invoke a legal wrong insanity defense, the
trier of fact could find “the defendant . . . legally insane if (1) he suffered from a delusional state and (2) his
delusion, if true, would lawfully justify killing in self-defense.”).
93. Id. at 824.
94. See Bloch & Gould, supra note 42, at 929. One could also posit a model in which the defendant looks
only to their own legal constructs, ones that might be entirely divorced from laws of the outside world.
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defendant’s own perception of the jurisdiction’s legal rules to the defendant’s
perception of the facts.95 If a qualifying mental illness caused the defendant to
fail or be unable to understand that they were violating the law, that could trigger
qualification for an insanity claim here. This internal legality model provides for
a defendant to misunderstand or misinterpret the law and still effectively invoke
an insanity defense. Such mental illness-provoked misunderstanding could be a
function of many influences,96 and it would not require that the defendant have
successfully fulfilled the actual elements of a legal justification or excuse.
Critics might contend that the above multi-model framework delves to a
level of granularity and distinction that fails to acknowledge the confusion and
breadth of distortions that mental illness can cause. But understanding right from
wrong is contextual and nuanced and deserves elucidation to clarify distinctions
both in perceptions by defendants and existing and potential relevant legal
constructs.
In addition, critics might object because the analysis embeds the common
assumption about free will underlying most criminal law—that free will exists
and that human beings exercise choice in many contexts. 97 Neuroscientific
inquiry is raising questions about the existence and applicability of free will. 98
Consequently, it might be that criminal law doctrine fails to reflect the reality of
how our brains function. Such a failure would suggest that our current doctrinal

Commentators might disagree about whether such a model does or could exist. See, e.g., Yakush & Wolbransky,
supra note 46, at 359–60 (“[W]ithin any given jurisdiction, there is only one set of laws. Thus, in regard to the
legal aspect of wrongfulness, a citizen of California is judged by whether or not he had the capacity to know that
the act violated the laws of that state. . . . [T]here is only one perspective of what is illegal and legal.”).
95. See Bloch & Gould, supra note 42, at 929.
96. For a discussion of some of the influences that might produce such a misperception and/or that might
provide the defendant a personal perception that the basic tenets of a legal justification were met, see e.g.,
Johnston & Leahey, supra note 10, at 1811–12, 1820–36.
97. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952) (explaining that “[t]he contention that an injury
can amount to a crime only when inflicted by intention is no provincial or transient notion. It is as universal and
persistent in mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and duty of
the normal individual to choose between good and evil.”).
98. See, e.g., Robert M. Sapolsky, Neuroscience and the Law, 15 U. ST. THOMAS J. L. & PUB. POL’Y, 138,
138 (2021) (“I believe there is no free will whatsoever, and that is going to have to utterly transform how we
think about every aspect of our society. From how we judge harshly, to how we praise, and everything in
between.”). See generally Patrick Haggard, Decision Time for Free Will, 69 NEURON 404 (2011); Peter S. Davies
& Peter A. Alces, Neuroscience Changes More than You Can Think, 2017 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 141 (2017)
(reviewing OWEN D. JONES, JEFFREY D. SCHALL & FRANCIS X. SHEN, LAW & NEUROSCIENCE (2014). But see
e.g., Stephen J. Morse, The Non-Problem of Free Will in Forensic Psychiatry and Psychology, 25 BEHAV. SCI.
L. 203, 203 (2007) (“Solving the free will problem would have profound implications for responsibility doctrines
and practices, but, at present, the problem plays no proper role in forensic practice or theory because this ability
or its lack is not a criterion of any civil or criminal law doctrine.”); Stephen J. Morse, Internal and External
Challenges to Culpability, 53 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 617, 618 (2021) (“I address the newer, broader challenges to
personhood, agency and responsibility that are fueled by alleged advances in behavioral neuroscience and
genetics. Some of these are quite radical. They may even turn out to be correct, but at present, there is no
conceptual or empirical reason to believe that they are true. Moreover, there is certainly insufficient reason to
jettison notions of criminal responsibility that have been developing for centuries and to adopt instead the
proposed, radical conception of justice.”).
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approach to insanity, among other criminal law principles, might need
reevaluation.99
In the interim, the models offer a range of variations in the understanding
of moral and legal wrongfulness, a number of which reflect different doctrinal
approaches to legal insanity in the United States today.
II. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DOG, WOLVES, AND GOD EXAMPLES
With this conceptual and doctrinal backdrop, we turn now to parse in some
detail the dissent’s and majority’s discussions that suggest a dog’s command to
kill could enable a successful insanity claim. The dog-as-commander example
implies two critical assumptions. The first is important but relatively
uncontroversial. If one should be excused under legal insanity when one
perceives a dog as ordering one to commit homicide,100 this suggests, as
described earlier,101 that the trier of fact should take the facts as the defendant
believed them to be when evaluating an insanity claim. This reflects and
endorses a fundamental principle of legal insanity and delusions as articulated
in M’Naghten: the jury looks through the defendant’s lens and delusion, no
matter how distorted, to ascertain the facts of the events to which the law will be
applied.102
The second assumption is that a delusion unmoored to societal perceptions
of wrongfulness (either moral or legal) necessarily warrants a finding of legal
insanity. That assumption and its problematic implications drive this Article. If
we declare that someone implementing a dog’s command to commit homicide,
even someone claiming moral correctness and acting in response to a qualifying
mental illness, is necessarily legally insane, what does that mean in terms of the
moral capacity prong of M’Naghten or its progeny?
Three concerns emerge from the approach. First, the dissent implies that
obeying the mental-illness generated command of a dog to kill equates to an
inability to discern right from wrong.103 In his example where the dog commands
the killing, Justice Breyer argues that “the defendant[] differ[s] from ordinary
persons in ways that would lead most of us to say that they should not be held
morally responsible for their acts.”104 But the only significant difference the
dissent has enumerated is that the defendant suffers from the command
hallucination caused by a mental illness.105 From a conceptual perspective,
99. See, e.g., Gardar Árnason, Neuroscience, Free Will and Moral Responsibility, 15 J. HUMANS. & SOC.
SCI. 147, 154 (2011). Árnason opines that “[i]f the view that free will is an illusion becomes widely
accepted . . . the legal system would have to be drastically revised. Justice and desert cannot play any part in
punishment . . . ” Id. at 147. Árnason argues, however, “that neuroscience has not revealed free will to be an
illusion and that it is not likely ever to do so.” Id at 154.
100. Assuming the trier of fact finds that the defendant believed they actually heard this command.
101. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
102. Id.
103. Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S. Ct. 1021, 1038 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 1048.
105. Id. at 1038–50.
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determining wrongfulness, however, depends upon more than that. It depends
on which model or variation the jurisdiction applies to evaluate insanity claims.
A blanket conclusion that the defendant qualifies as legally insane because a dog
commanded the defendant to kill, without an investigation of the applicable
model, is premature and potentially inaccurate. Second, and, in addition, the
defendant’s motivation for acting in response to the perceived command can be
determinative of an insanity claim. The dissent supplies no rationale for the
defendant’s acquiescing to the command (other than perhaps the mental illness
itself and that the example “falls within [M’Naghten’s] second prong”),106 which
also suggests that Justice Breyer’s conclusion is premature. Third, if the
majority’s exposition of the example,107 is somehow understood as endorsing an
internal morality model, that embrace warrants explicit consideration. The
majority opinion refers to “those who know exactly what they are doing
(including that it is against the law) but believe it morally justified—because,
say, it is commanded by God (or in the dissent’s case, a dog).”108 In particular,
a defendant believing their conduct is morally justified when acting on the
command of a dog leaves open the question of whether their belief takes into
account an external morality or stems from a personal internal moral code.
In Kahler, the Court recognized that jurisdictions have adopted myriad
versions of the early M’Naghten test, with some closer to the original, and others
rejecting or substantially rewriting portions of it.109 As the Kahler dissent and
Appendix make clear, however, the vast majority of U.S. jurisdictions continue
to include a wrongfulness prong of some variety.110 But the fact that there is a
wrongfulness prong does not answer the question of whether the defendant who
obeys the dog will qualify as insane pursuant to the specific wrongfulness model
adopted. Consequently, without contextualizing which variation of the models
applies and how, readers are left without adequate guidance.
Beyond the importance of knowing the specifics of the jurisdiction’s
adopted model, Justice Breyer’s underspecified example in the dissent lacks any
discussion of motivational incentives beyond the fact that the conduct was
commanded by a dog.111 Even if the individual’s motivation derives only from

106. Id. at 1038–1050.
107. Id. at 1036 (majority opinion).
108. Id.
109. See id. at 1025.
110. Id. at 1051–59 (Appendix).
111. Id. at 1038–50 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer does suggest that the illness-generated command
delusion means that the accused does not understand the wrongfulness of the conduct, but this seems to be a
conclusion, rather than a motivation for the conduct as that conduct is described in the dissent’s analysis. Id. In
Justice Breyer’s dissent from the denial of certiorari in Delling v. Idaho, Justice Breyer cites an amicus brief,
which explains that mental illness can cause an individual to “‘wrongly believe the act is justified.’” Delling v.
Idaho, 568 U.S. 1038 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting in denial of certiorari) (citing Brief Amici Curiae of 52
Criminal Law and Mental Health Law Professors at 10, Delling, 568 U.S. 1038 (No. 11-1515)). However, Justice
Breyer does not describe the illness in the dog-as-commander example beyond noting that it is “a severe mental
illness.” Id. at 1038.
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a delusional view of reality,112 rarely will an individual act without some
motivation. Noting that the defendant’s acts were prompted by the dog’s
command does provide an initial level of motivation, but the command by the
dog to commit homicide tells us little about why the defendant obeyed. If the
defendant obeyed because the defendant has enormous respect for the
intelligence of dogs, that might produce a different result than if, similar to
Stephen’s excerpted example, the defendant claimed that the dog was an oracle
who could predict the future and, in that future, all of the human race would
perish immediately if the defendant did not commit the killing. Arguably, under
the respect for canine intelligence motive, even with the facts as the defendant
understood them, the delusion invokes no traditional defense or excuse, nor does
it effectively suggest that the defendant failed to or was unable to understand the
wrongfulness (moral or legal) of the act. In an external legality or morality
model, that presentation would not necessarily lead to the dissent’s conclusion
that an insanity claim would prevail. As previous scholars have opined more
generally, “a defendant who experienced command auditory hallucinations that
ordered him to commit an illegal/immoral act, while retaining the cognitive
reasoning necessary to know it was nonetheless wrong, would have no case for
insanity.”113 In contrast, believing that the conduct was morally or legally right,
because it would preserve the human race from imminent destruction, might
engage a moral or legal defense of others or necessity114 claim. There, an
insanity verdict—a defendant’s failure to understand that the conduct was wrong
under some moral or legal societal standard—arguably possesses logical force
in an external model.
Motivations can be determinative of the insanity claim. Although Justice
Breyer emphasizes the importance of a motivational inquiry,115 beyond
acknowledging that the defendant was responding to a dog’s command, the
example fails to respect the key role played by asking “why” the defendant
perpetrated the act. This Article suggests that the lack of adequate inquiry about
motivational rationale undermines Justice Breyer’s definitive conclusion that
legal insanity should excuse the defendant in the dog-as-commander example.

112. Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1048 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer notes that “mental illness . . . affects
[] motivations for forming [] intent.” Id. (citation omitted). He writes, “[f]or example, the American Psychiatric
Association tells us that individuals suffering from mental illness may experience delusions—erroneous
perceptions of the outside world held with strong conviction. They may believe, incorrectly, that others are
threatening them harm (persecutory delusions), that God has commanded them to engage in certain conduct
(religious delusions), or that they or others are condemned to a life of suffering (depressive delusions).” Id.
(citation omitted).
113. Yakush & Wolbransky, supra note 46, at 366. Yakush & Wolbransky do provide a separate analysis
of commands from God or “a higher power.” Id. at 370–71.
114. The necessity or lesser-of-two-evils option, however, would presumably only be available in a
jurisdiction that allowed such a defense in homicide cases and then only under the requirements of that
jurisdiction’s approach to insanity.
115. Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1048 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Let us consider more specifically how two of the models outlined earlier
might apply to the dog-as-commander example to demonstrate the potential
inaccuracy of the legal insanity label that the dissent assigns and the Court
implies. The analysis applies an externally-focused morality framework and
then an internally-focused morality framework.116
In an external morality evaluation, we generally assess whether, relying on
the defendant’s perception of the facts, the defendant understood that killing a
human being would violate society’s code of appropriate conduct or society
would find that conduct morally unacceptable.117 Even if the defendant
perceived that a dog ordered the defendant to kill someone and had no personal
moral qualms about the killing, the defendant might, for example, still
understand that society would condemn such a killing.118 The defendant might
have obeyed because they respected canine intelligence or wanted to
demonstrate the type of reciprocal loyalty to canines that dogs often display
toward their owners. Alternatively, the defendant may have obeyed for
innumerable other reasons, like an inability to conform their conduct to the
law,119 which would not necessarily defeat or undermine the defendant’s ability
to understand that homicide under such circumstances would violate society’s
moral codes or norms. In these scenarios, even if the defendant personally
believed that the killing was morally justified, the defendant would be unlikely
to meet the doctrinal prerequisites for legal insanity under an external morality
approach.

116. This can be a multifaceted analysis when the defendant claims to have “special knowledge” as might
be the case if the defendant claimed that the dog was an oracle who could predict the future and, in that future,
without the death of the homicide victim, all of the human race would perish immediately.
117. See e.g., supra notes 74–78 and accompanying text. Yakush & Wolbransky suggest that an additional
inquiry about the defendant’s personal belief that the conduct was justified may also be involved in California.
Yakush & Wolbransky, supra note 46 at 364 n.13.
118. Professor Fredrick Vars offers another perspective on Justice Breyer’s failure to analyze the perception
of wrongfulness in the dog example. Fredrick E. Vars, Of Death and Delusion: What Survives Kahler v. Kansas?,
169 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 90, 93 (2020) (footnote omitted). He suggests that “[a]s [this] hypothetical reveals,
the dissent was not wed to the moral incapacity test: one could feel compelled to follow a dog’s order even while
recognizing that doing so is wrong.” Id. But see Morse, Internal and External Challenges, supra note 98, at 645
(“One of the defects of the Kahler dissent, in my opinion, is that it suggested that some form of ‘moral
understanding’ test was required.”).
119. This test is generally known as the “irresistible-impulse” test. Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1028. Trial
testimony from the defense’s forensic psychiatrist in the Kahler case raised this possibility. The psychiatrist
opined that Kahler’s “‘capacity to manage his own behavior had been severely degraded so that he couldn’t
refrain from doing what he did.’” State v. Kahler, 410 P.3d 105, 114 (Kan. 2018). Professor Joshua Dressler has
argued: “James Kahler likely was not insane under the M’Naghten test. The closest the defense expert came to
making a case for insanity was when he reported that Kahler ‘felt compelled’ to kill. That sounds like a volitional
incapacity claim, not a cognitive one. And, since Kahler purposely spared his son—who wanted to spend more
time with his father—this fact makes even a volitional argument suspect.” Joshua Dressler, Kahler v. Kansas:
Ask the Wrong Question, You Get the Wrong Answer, 18 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 409, 413 (2020) (footnotes
omitted). Other commentators also note that expert testimony at Kahler’s trial suggested that Kahler might “have
become dissociated from reality at the time of the crime.” Morse, Internal and External Challenges, supra note
98, at 643.
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The analysis thus far suggests that the dissent’s conclusion, that the dogas-commander example as given would result in an insanity verdict, is likely
inaccurate under an external morality model. This is because experiencing an
illness-generated command from a dog to kill does not necessarily mean that the
defendant believed that society would approve of the conduct nor does the
dissent offer a motivation or rationale that would provide society, in the form of
the trier of fact, a moral justification, beyond the mental illness itself, for
approving the conduct.
With respect to the Kahler majority opinion, the majority does expressly
recognize that the defendant’s perception of morality matters. 120 However, the
majority’s assertion that the defendant believed their conduct to be “morally
justified”121 in the dog or God examples does not resolve the concern about
whether that belief involved reference to societal norms or to the defendant’s
personal moral values. While many readers might fairly assume an external
morality model, others might not. In light of the history of the application of the
internal morality model in at least one federal circuit court,122 this lack of clarity
calls for further elucidation by the majority. In addition, in some applications,
even if the defendant believed that society would not condemn their actions, that
is not the determinative test under that external morality model.123
Consequently, even if one interprets the majority’s description as referring not
to the defendant’s personal morality but to the defendant believing that society
would find their conduct morally justified, if the defendant’s conduct of obeying
the dog actually violated societal norms from the perspective of a reasonable
person in the defendant’s circumstances, the defendant’s belief would be
unlikely to excuse the defendant’s conduct in a jurisdiction with such a
definition. Both of these limitations, the lack of specification of societal as
opposed to personal morality and the existence of a jurisdictional approach to
external morality that would not necessarily excuse the conduct, call for greater
clarity in the treatment of wrongfulness by the Kahler majority.
Beyond the questions of the rationale, the defendant’s awareness of
wrongfulness, internal versus external morality, and which definition of morality
controls in an external morality model, consider more specifically the question
of the identity of the commander. Imagine that, instead of perceiving a dog as
commanding the killing, the defendant perceived that a human stranger ordered
them to commit the murder (and that perception was due to a hallucination
provoked by a qualifying mental illness). Would the defendant necessarily
qualify for an insanity defense? Among other considerations, the answer should
require a determination of the wrongfulness model applicable in the jurisdiction,
a motivational analysis, and, depending on the jurisdiction, a careful assessment

120.
121.
122.
123.

Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1036.
Id.
See supra notes 79–83 and accompanying text.
See e.g., State v. Uyesugi, 60 P.3d 843, 856 (Haw. 2002).
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of what the defendant understood at the time about the wrongfulness of the
conduct. The key difference between the dog and stranger examples is that
society would probably assume mental illness existed when a defendant claimed
to have acted in response to a command from a dog,124 as most of us do not
perceive dogs as ordering us to behave, whereas that assumption does not apply
in the case of commands by other humans. Using a dog as the commander makes
visible the likelihood of mental illness, but does not ordain the conclusion of
legal insanity. Thus, contrary to Justice Breyer’s assertion in the dissent, on this
analysis too, insanity doctrine in jurisdictions that apply an external view of
moral wrongfulness would not necessarily support an insanity verdict here.
In contrast to a command from a dog, if the defendant perceived the
command as emanating from God, the analysis would likely change. As courts
and commentators have noted, a perceived command from God can often be
understood as invoking a higher law.125 A defendant obeying such a command
might well believe that their conduct in response to the command would not
violate society’s moral codes or norms.126 Moreover, society, through the triers
of fact, might readily perceive obeying a command that the defendant
understood came from God as within the norms of society. Thus, under an
external morality approach, they could conclude that the defendant failed to
perceive the conduct as wrong and condemned by society’s morals, and they too
might decide that, under the circumstances, responding to such a command did
not violate society’s norms. Under this scenario, the verdict might well be in
conformity with the assertion of legal insanity in Kahler. The actor who does the
commanding can matter in the insanity context. Not only does the dissent’s
choice of a dog as the commander raise questions about whether an insanity
verdict is likely in an external morality model, but, in addition, the majority’s
failure to explicitly distinguish between a command from a dog and one from
God renders the opinion subject to criticism here with respect to that model.127
Returning to the command by a dog, but next superimposing an internal
morality model, this model asks whether the defendant was able to understand
124. This is consistent with the approach by Justice Breyer. See Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1048 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
125. See, e.g., People v. Schmidt, 110 N.E. 945 (N.Y. 1915) (“Obedience to the law is itself a moral duty.
If, however, there is an insane delusion that God has appeared to the defendant and ordained the commission of
a crime, we think it cannot be said of the offender that he knows the act to be wrong.”); Brief of American
Psychiatric Ass’n. & American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at
16, Delling v. Idaho, 568 U.S. 1038 (2012) (No. 11-1515), (“And, religious delusions can be manifested as a
conviction that one must carry out certain acts – even if they are against the law – because they are commanded
by God.”) (citation omitted); State v. Wilson, 700 A.2d 633, 641 (Conn. 1997) (“[W]e are hard pressed to
envision an individual who, because of mental disease or defect, truly believes that a divine power has authorized
his actions, but, at the same time, also truly believes that such actions are immoral. An individual laboring under
a delusion that causes him to believe in the divine approbation of his conduct is an individual who, in all
practicality, is unlikely to be able fully to appreciate the wrongfulness of that conduct.”).
126. Cf. Wilson, 700 A.2d 633, 641.
127. The majority opinion had a focused discussion about commands perceived as coming from God, which,
in a jurisdiction that had a moral capacity option, might excuse a defendant. See Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1026.
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that their actions were wrong according to their own internal world view, not
whether their behavior violated society’s moral codes. This model might upend
current state and federal interpretations of the wrongfulness prong.128 However,
assuming it were the relevant model, although Justice Breyer asserts that the
dog-as-commander example falls within the M’Naghten prong on wrongfulness,
the Kahler dissent does not offer an explicit analysis of the defendant’s
perception of wrongfulness in its use of the dog analogy.129 Consequently, it is
not clear that application of this model in the dissent’s dog analogy would
produce a legal insanity result here either.
In the Kahler dissent, for an internal morality model, where the defendant’s
perception of the morality or wrongfulness of, and rationale for, obeying the
command were not detailed, to find insanity, one presumably must accept that
following a command from a dog to kill a human does not register on the
defendant’s moral compass as wrong. Without more, this seems a questionable
assumption. Even if one dwells within the defendant’s internal universe of
acceptable behavior, and accepts as true that dogs’ commands must be obeyed,
the defendant might still find their own conduct reprehensible. Maybe the
defendant understands the nature and quality of their act and understands their
conduct as wrong (legally and morally) but cannot help themselves from
committing it. As only a minority of jurisdictions incorporate an irresistible
impulse prong into their insanity tests,130 and that test involves a different
inquiry than the one in the internal morality model described here, the defendant
might be found sane under even an internal morality wrongfulness rubric.
Overall, the dissent’s assertion that a dog’s homicidal command to the defendant
would necessarily excuse the defendant under the traditional doctrine of legal
insanity is not borne out by careful analysis of current external morality doctrinal
approaches or perhaps even an internal morality approach.
To be clear, Justice Breyer’s dissent focuses on the importance of
incorporating an analysis of wrongfulness in sanity evaluations to excuse a
defendant and decries the majority’s finding that Kansas can constitutionally
permit the elimination of that traditional analysis.131 Despite this, however, the
simplified dog example lacks critical analysis of what wrongfulness means.
128. United States. v. Ewing, 494 F.3d 607, 610 (7th Cir. 2007) (“M’Naghten’s Case and American case
law applying it establish that a defendant’s ability to appreciate right and wrong has consistently been determined
by reference to societal, not personal, standards of morality.”).
129. Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1025, 1038 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer does write that “[i]t is no
defense simply to claim that one’s criminal conduct was morally right.” Id. at 1047. However, this does not
appear to refer to definitions of wrongfulness in insanity. Rather, it appears in the context of discussing the
relationship more generally of moral law to the criminal law, as follows: “The criminal law does not adopt, nor
does it perfectly track, moral law. It is no defense simply to claim that one’s criminal conduct was morally right.
But the criminal law nonetheless tries in various ways to prevent the distance between criminal law and morality
from becoming too great.” Id. Included among the ways that Justice Breyer explains that distance is mitigated
are defenses, like insanity and duress, prosecutorial discretion to decline prosecution, and executive clemency.
Id.
130. For a brief discussion of the irresistible impulse test, see supra note 72.
131. Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1038–50 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Before concluding, we should talk about supernatural wolves. In the 2012
dissent to a denial of certiorari in Delling v. Idaho,132 Justice Breyer furnished a
different but related “very much simplified example”133 of legal insanity. Justice
Breyer posited: if “the defendant, due to insanity, believes that a wolf, a
supernatural figure, has ordered him to kill the victim [,]”134 that would furnish
a legal insanity defense.135 Two significant features of this example and the
explanation that Justice Breyer provides distinguish it from the dog example in
Kahler.
First, Justice Breyer provides an important insight into the defendant’s
perspective about the wolf. Unlike the dog, the wolf is not from this world. A
supernatural entity is defined as one “of or relating to an order of existence
beyond the visible observable universe especially: of or relating to God or a god,
demigod, spirit, or devil.”136 In other words, the supernatural wolf figure could
be understood as invoking some of the deference and powers associated with
powerful entities or deities of religion whose commands are often perceived as
morally compelling. Thus, the supernatural wolf might be seen as more akin to
a deity in terms of the impact on the insanity analysis than to a dog that lacks
any attribution of extraordinary power.
The second feature that the Delling dissent offers is a hypothesis to explain
the defendant’s belief that the act was not wrongful. Justice Breyer indicates that
“amici tell us that those seriously mentally ill individuals often possess the kind
of mental disease . . . [where] they know that the victim is a human being, but
due to mental illness, such as a paranoid delusion, they wrongly believe the act
is justified.”137 Providing that rationale represents greater engagement with
essential dimensions of wrongfulness in legal insanity than does the treatment
of the dog-as-commander example by the dissent in Kahler.
Still, even with reference to the supernatural quality of the wolf and a
recognition that mental illness can cause an inaccurate perception of
wrongfulness, the wolf example should not automatically warrant an insanity
defense. As with the dog example, the wolf example lacks important
information, including recognition that multiple wrongfulness models exist and
that their differences matter. For example, in a jurisdiction that applies an
external legality model, a defendant who believes their act was morally justified
might still understand that an order to commit murder, even from a supernatural

132. Delling v. Idaho, 568 U.S. 1038, 133 S. Ct. 504 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting in denial of certiorari).
133. Id. at 505.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Definition of “supernatural,” MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/supernatural (last visited Apr. 15, 2022).
137. Delling, 568 U.S. 1038, 133 S. Ct. 504 (Breyer, J., dissenting in denial of certiorari). In the Kahler
dissent, Justice Breyer also refers to information from the Brief for American Psychiatric Association et al. as
Amici Curiae, but the Kahler reference lacks a focus on the question of the defendant’s perception of moral
justification. Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S. Ct. 1021, 1048 (2020) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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wolf, violates society’s laws.138 In that jurisdiction, with this understanding,
contrary to Justice Breyer’s conclusion, the defendant would be unlikely to
qualify as insane.139
CONCLUSION
Why does it matter that the Supreme Court’s engagement with the
simplified dog-as-commander example in Kahler lacks analytical depth and
precision? Supreme Court language and examples provide grounding for lower
court interpretation and real-world implementation, even when they are not the
holding. Consequently, unearthing limitations of the Court’s and dissent’s
analyses can deter reliance on problematic implications of the dog-ascommander example. Wrongfulness analyses benefit from careful parsing and
application of the jurisdiction’s doctrinal model, as well as a detailed focus on
why the defendant engaged in the conduct at issue. The challenges and opacity
that Kahler’s invocation of the dog-as-commander engenders call for further
efforts to clarify the intended scope and implications of wrongfulness in legal
insanity.

138. Because an external legality model still anticipates a wrongfulness or blameworthiness evaluation, and
because Justice Breyer argues at some length that, although logically different, “there is no indication that [the
distinction between legal and moral wrong] makes a meaningful difference in practice[,]” it seems fair to
evaluate the dog-as-commander example under this model. Id. at 1046.
139. Alternatively, even if the defendant believed that society would not condemn their act, they might find
themselves in a jurisdiction that anticipated evaluation of wrongfulness from the perspective of a reasonable
person in the defendant’s circumstances. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. That perspective might
produce a different result than the insanity determination suggested by Justice Breyer in the dog-as-commander
example in the dissent in Kahler.

